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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate equilibrium cycles in dynamic general equilibrium models
with cash-in-advance constraints. Our ﬁndings are two-fold. First, in such models, if
an equilibrium cycle exists, then there also exists a continuum of equilibrium cycles in
its neighborhood. Second, the limit cycle, to which a dynamic path converges, varies
continuously according to the initial distribution of the money holdings. Thus, temporary
shocks that aﬀect the initial distribution have permanent eﬀects in such models; that is,
such models exhibit hysteresis. Furthermore, we also explore the logic behind the results.
Keywords: Dynamic General Equilibrium Models, Cash-in-Advance, Cycles, Hysteresis.
JEL Classiﬁcation Number: D51, E40, E50, E60.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate equilibrium cycles in dynamic general equilibrium models with cash-
in-advance constraints, wherein each agent’s money holding varies over time. We ﬁrst show that
a continuum of equilibrium cycles exists in a speciﬁc model with cash-in-advance constraints,
and that the limit cycle, to which a dynamic path converges, varies continuously according to the
initial distribution of money holdings. Thus, temporary shocks that aﬀect the initial distribution
have permanent eﬀects on such models; that is, these models exhibit hysteresis. Then, using a
general framework, we also explore the logic behind the results.
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1Our ﬁnding on a continuum of equilibrium cycles is new to the literature on this subject.
In optimal growth models, a continuum of equilibrium cycles has never been found as a nonde-
generate case, although a ﬁnite number of cycles have been observed. (See, for example, Mitra
and Nishimura [12].) In random matching models with ﬁat money, a continuum of stationary
(non-cycle) equilibria has been found in both speciﬁc and general models. (See, for example,
Green and Zhou [4], [5], Kamiya and Shimizu [6], Matsui and Shimizu [11], and Zhou [13].)1
However, even in such models, a continuum of equilibrium cycles has never been found.
Our ﬁnding on hysteresis is also new to the literature on monetary economics.2 In monetary
models with Walrasian markets, there typically exist a ﬁnite number of stationary equilibria.
Hysteresis cannot be found in the case of unique stationary equilibrium; that is, if the equilibrium
is stable, then the dynamic paths converge to the stationary equilibrium from any initial point.
In the case of multiple equilibria, only large shocks at the initial point can change the limit
point, and thus, hysteresis cannot be found for a small shock. In a random matching model
with money, Green and Zhou [5] ﬁnd a continuum of stationary equilibria, and show that any
stationary equilibrium can be reached from any initial point; that is, there is indeterminacy in
dynamic paths. Therefore, in their model, any temporary shock does not have an eﬀect.
Blanchard and Summers [2] demonstrate that unemployment hysteresis arises from insider-
dominated wage determination. In their model, they assume that wage determination is domi-
nated by inside workers. Hysteresis arises since wages depend on the number of inside workers,
which in turn depends on past employment. On the other hand, Baldwin [1] shows that hysteresis
arises from large exchange rate swings under the assumption that market entry costs are sunk.
A large temporary rise in the exchange rate induces foreign ﬁrms to enter the market. When
the exchange rate falls to the original level, some new entrants remain in the market because of
sunk costs. These logics are clearly very diﬀerent from ours; we demonstrate that if ﬁat money
has value and an equilibrium cycle exists, then hysteresis arises.
In this paper, we ﬁrst show that in a speciﬁc model, there exists a continuum of equilibrium
cycles that exhibits hysteresis. Then, using a general model, we explore the logic behind the
results. In this model, there is a continuum of agents and the number of goods is L ¸ 1,
and in each time period, a Walrasian market with cash-in-advance constraints is open for each
good. Each consumer is characterized by a net demand function, z(´;p1;p2;:::), where ´ is the
1Kamiya and Shimizu [8] also construct models in which centralized auction markets have a continuum of sta-
tionary equilibria, but Walrasian markets with cash-in-advance constraints have a unique stationary equilibrium.
2For a survey on hysteresis in economics, see Franz [3] among others.
2consumer’s money holding at the beginning of the period and pt 2 RL
++;t = 1;2;:::, is a price
vector in period t. In other words, z(´;p1;p2;:::) 2 RL is the ﬁrst period net consumption
vector when she maximizes a utility stream under some conditions, including budget constraints
and cash-in-advance constraints. We demonstrate that if an equilibrium cycle exists, then there
is a continuum of equilibrium cycles under some conditions. We also show that if a dynamic
path converges to an equilibrium cycle from an initial money holdings distribution, then under
some conditions, the limit cycle continuously depends on the initial money holdings. Thus, a
temporal policy shock that aﬀects the initial money holdings distribution also has a permanent
eﬀect; that is, hysteresis occurs.
In Section 2, we ﬁrst investigate a speciﬁc model, and show that a continuum of equilibrium
cycles exists and that the limit cycle continuously depends on the initial money holdings distri-
bution. Then, in Section 3, even in a rather general framework, we obtain the same results. In
Section 4, we discuss some speciﬁc assumptions in the model in Section 2. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section 5.
2 A Model with Cycles
We use a simple framework that is similar to Kiyotaki and Wright [9]. Time is discrete, denoted
by t = 1;2;:::. There is a continuum of agents, whose measure is one. There are T ¸ 3 types of
agents with equal fractions and the same number of types of goods. We assume that the goods
are perishable and divisible. A type ¿ agent can produce good ¿ + 1 for ¿ = 1;:::;T ¡ 1, and
a type T agent can produce good 1. Throughout this section, we assume that each agent can
produce just one unit of her production good with production cost c ¸ 0 in each time period.3
A type ¿ agent obtains utility U(q) only when she consumes q amount of good ¿. In this section,
we consider a linear utility function U(q) = aq, where a > c. Let ± 2 (0;1) be the discount
factor. Our framework includes divisible and durable ﬁat money, whose nominal stock is M > 0.
At each time period, a competitive spot market is open. Purchases of goods are subject to
a cash-in-advance constraint. We also assume a participation constraint: in each time period an
agent can visit only one market; that is, she must choose to be either a buyer or a seller in each
time period. Â = 1 means that she only consumes her consumption good, and Â = 0 means that
3In this paper, we distinguish between the terms “period” and “time period”; “Period” means a period in
a cycle, while “time period” means a period in an entire sequence. For example, when a sequence of prices is
(p1;p2;p3;p4;p5;p6;p7;p8;:::) = (pa;pb;pc;pd;pc;pd;pc;pd;:::), then the price in the second time period is pb
and the price in the second period in the cycle is pd.
3she only produces her production good. Each agent solves the following optimization problem




±t¡1(ÂtU(qt) ¡ (1 ¡ Ât)c)
s.t. Ât˜ ptqt + ´t+1 = ´t + (1 ¡ Ât)˜ pt; t = 1;2;:::;
Ât˜ ptqt · ´t;´t ¸ 0; t = 1;2;:::;
´1 ¸ 0 given;
where ´t is the agent’s money holding at the beginning of time period t, ˜ pt is the given price of
her consumption good at time period t, and qt is the amount of consumption at time period t.
Note that the agent can choose to “do nothing” by choosing (Â;q) = (1;0). A sequence of price
(˜ p1; ˜ p2;:::) is said to be an equilibrium price vector if each consumer solves the above problem
and all spot markets clear. Below, we focus on equilibria such that the consumers’ policies and
prices of goods are symmetric with respect to types; that is, ˜ pt and the optimum policies are the
same across types.
For simplicity, we make two assumptions: there is a participation constraint, and each agents
can produce only one unit of her production good. In Section 4 and Appendix, we show that
these assumptions are not necessary for obtaining the same results.
2.1 Equilibrium with a 2-Period Cycle
Here, we demonstrate there is a continuum of 2-period equilibrium cycles; that is, the equilibrium
price vector satisﬁes ˜ pt = ˜ pt+2 for t = 1;2;::: and money holdings of each agent alternate between
´0 and ´1, or ´0
0 and ´0
1, where ´0 and ´0
0 are money holdings in even periods, and ´1 and ´0
1 are
money holdings in odd periods. That is, in even periods, some agents have ´0 and the others
have ´0
0, and in odd periods, the former have ´1, and the latter have ´0
1. Moreover, the prices
are the same in even (odd) periods.
Theorem 1 Suppose ¡1 + ± + ±2 < c
a < ±. Then, a continuum of 2-period equilibrium cycles
exists.
Proof:
We ﬁrst construct a stationary equilibrium; that is, the case that ˜ pt is the same for all t. We
4then show that there is a continuum of 2-period equilibrium cycles in a neighborhood of the
stationary equilibrium.
We consider the following candidate for stationary equilibria:
² There exists a real number p > 0, such that (p;p;:::) is an equilibrium price vector.
² The policy of each agent is as follows: there exists ¯ ´ 2 (0;p), such that
– an agent with ´ 2 [0;´] sells her production good, and
– an agent with ´ 2 (´;1) spends all her money.
² The stationary money holdings distribution is as follows:
– the measure of agents without money is 1=2, and
– the measure of agents with p is 1=2.
² The value function is continuous.










Since agents with p amount of money spend all of it, and agents without money want to sell,








where the LHS is the supply of goods and the RHS is the demand for goods. Clearly, it is an
identity.
By the above policy, the value function is expressed as
V (´) =
(
¡c + ±V (´ + p); for ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´];
a





1¡±2 (a± ¡ c) + a±
p ´; for ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´];
±
1¡±2 (a± ¡ c) + a
p´; for ´ 2 (¯ ´;1):





Clearly, ´ 2 (0;p) follows from




Next, we show that the above policy is indeed optimal by stating the following inequality:
² V (´) ¸ 0 for ´.
² V (´) ¸ a
p´0 + ±V (´ ¡ ´0) for ´ 2 [0;´] and ´0 2 [0;´].
² V (´) ¸ ¡c + ±V (´ + p) for ´ 2 (´;1).
² V (´) ¸ a
p´0 + ±V (´ ¡ ´0) for ´ 2 (´;1) and ´0 2 [0;´) .
By (1), we can easily verify that the above conditions are satisﬁed with strict inequalities. Thus,
we have shown that the above candidate is indeed a stationary equilibrium under (1).
Next, we demonstrate that there exists is a continuum of 2-period equilibrium cycles in a
neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium. We denote the price in even periods by p0 and that
in odd periods by p1. Let h0 be the measure of agents with p0 amount of money at the beginning
of odd periods and with no money at the beginning of even periods, and let h1 be the measure
of agents with no money at the beginning of odd periods and with p1 amount of money at the
beginning of even periods. Clearly, h0 > 0, h1 > 0 and
h0 + h1 = 1 (2)
must be satisﬁed.
Since the total amount of money is M,








hold. The condition for market clearing is
h0p0 = h1p1:
That is, in even periods, the LHS is the value of supply and the RHS is the total expenditure,
whereas in odd periods, the LHS is the total expenditure and the RHS is the value of sup-
ply. Thus, (3) clearly implies the market clearing condition. In other words, this condition is
redundant. Note that this argument applies to rather general cases. (See Section 3.1.)




¡c + ±V1(´ + p0); for ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´0];
a
p0´ + ±V1(0); for ´ 2 (¯ ´0;1);
V1(´) =
(
¡c + ±V0(´ + p1); for ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´1];
a
p1´ + ±V0(0); for ´ 2 (¯ ´1;1):





p1´; for ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´0];
± a±h0¡ch1
(1¡±2)h1 + a





p0´; for ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´1];
± a±h1¡ch0
(1¡±2)h0 + a
p1´; for ´ 2 (¯ ´1;1):
By the continuity of V0 and V1,
¯ ´0 =
M(a±h2
1 + c±h0h1 ¡ a±2h2
0 ¡ ch0h1)




0 + c±h0h1 ¡ a±2h2
1 ¡ ch0h1)
ah0h1(h1 ¡ ±h0)(1 ¡ ±2)
: (5)
Note that if h0 = h1 = 1
2, then the above is equal to the value function of the stationary
equilibrium. Recall that the optimality conditions are satisﬁed with strict inequalities under (1).
Therefore, for suﬃciently small ² > 0, the above value functions with (h0;h1) = (1
2 ¡ ²; 1
2 + ²)
constitute an equilibrium under (1).
72.2 T-Period Equilibrium Cycles where T ¸ 3
We show that the model also has a continuum of T-period equilibrium cycles, where T ¸ 3. As
in Section 2.1, we ﬁrst construct a stationary equilibrium with T states, and then transform it
into a continuum of T-period equilibrium cycles.
Theorem 2 Suppose ± ¡ (T ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±2) < c
a < ± ¡ (T ¡ 2)(1 ¡ ±2). Then, a continuum of
T-period equilibrium cycles exists.
Proof:
First, we consider the following candidate for stationary equilibria:
² There exists a real number p > 0, such that (p;p;:::) is an equilibrium price vector.
² The policy of each agent is as follows: there exists ¯ ´ 2 ((T ¡ 2)p;(T ¡ 1)p) such that
– an agent with ´ 2 [0;´] sells her production good, and
– an agent with ´ 2 (´;1) spends all her money.
² The support of a stationary money holdings distribution is f0;p;:::;(T ¡ 1)pg, and the
measure of agents with money holdings ip is 1=T for i = 0;1;:::;T ¡ 1.
² The value function is continuous.











(T ¡ 1) 1
T
:





and the latter condition is automatically satisﬁed.
8The value function satisﬁes
V (´) =
(
¡c + ±V (´ + p); if ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´];
a
p´ + ±V (0); if ´ 2 (¯ ´;1):




1¡±2 (a± ¡ c) + a±
p ´; if ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´];
±
1¡±2 (a± ¡ c) + a
p´; if ´ 2 (¯ ´;1):
(6)





´ 2 ((T ¡ 2)p;(T ¡ 1)p) follows from the following condition:
± ¡ (T ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±2) <
c
a
< ± ¡ (T ¡ 2)(1 ¡ ±2): (7)
The condition for the optimality of the speciﬁed policy is as follows:
² V (´) ¸ 0 for any ´.
² V (´) ¸ a
p´0 + ±V (´ ¡ ´0) for any ´ 2 [0;´) and any ´0 2 [0;´].
² V (´) ¸ a
p´0 + ±V (´ ¡ ´0) for any ´0 2 [0;´).
² V (´) ¸ ¡c + ±V (´ + p) for any ´ 2 (´;1).
² V (´) ¸ a
p´0 + ±V (´ ¡ ´0) for any ´ 2 (´;1) and any ´0 2 [0;´) .
By (6), it is easily veriﬁed that the above optimality conditions are satisﬁed with strict inequal-
ities under (7). Thus, we have shown that the speciﬁed money holdings distribution and policy
constitutes an equilibrium under (7).
Next, we transform the stationary equilibrium with T states into a continuum of equilibria
with a T-period cycle by perturbing the money holdings distribution. We denote the price at
time period Tn + i (i = 0;:::;T ¡ 1) by pi. For ease of exposition, let (i) = i mod T. Let hij
be the measure of agents with
Pj
k=1 p(i+T¡k) amount of money at time period Tn + i. (Let hi0
be the measure of agents with no money at time Tn + i.4)
4Throughout this paper, let n be the generic symbol of natural numbers including 0.
9The condition for a stationary cycle is that for any i and j, hij = h(i+1):(j+1) = ¢¢¢ =
h(i+T¡1):(j+T¡1).5 Therefore, if there is a vector h = (h0;:::;hT¡1) such that




hi = h0i = h1:(i+1) = ¢¢¢ = hT¡1:(i+T¡1); i = 0;:::;T ¡ 1;
then the condition holds.







p(i+T¡k); i = 0;:::;T ¡ 1: (8)
It is veriﬁed that (p0;p1;:::;pT¡1) is uniquely determined if each hij is suﬃciently close to 1=T.







; i = 0;:::;T ¡ 1:
Then, it is easily veriﬁed that the conditions for the stationary cycle and (8) imply the condition
for market clearing. In other words, the latter is redundant.





1¡² ; if i = 0;
1
T + ²i; if i 6= 0:
Then, by redeﬁning ´ such that the value function is continuous at ´, it is easily veriﬁed that
the above policy and hi constitute an equilibrium cycle under (7).
Remark 1 For s = 1;2;:::, it is veriﬁed that there exists a unique ± 2 (0;1) such that ± ¡(s¡
1)(1 ¡ ±2) = c
a. We denote such a ± by ˆ ±s. Then, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that there exists
a continuum of T(¸ 2)-period equilibrium cycles if ± 2 (ˆ ±T¡1; ˆ ±T). Clearly, ˆ ±1 < ˆ ±2 < ¢¢¢ < 1
and lims!1 ˆ ±s = 1 hold. Therefore, for almost every ± > c
a, there exists a T ¸ 2 such that
a continuum of T-period equilibrium cycles also exists, and such a T is unique as long as the
equilibria in Theorem 2 are considered.
5We have used hi:j instead of hij when the latter expression may be confusing.
10Remark 2 The indeterminacy in the above theorem is real since the distributions of utilities
are diﬀerent across ². However, the welfare that is deﬁned as the weighted average of agents’
values is the same for all ², since the utility function is linear and the cost function is simple. In
Appendix, we show that the welfare can be diﬀerent in the case of a strictly convex cost function.
2.3 Dynamic Equilibria Leading to 2-Period Cycles
In this section, we analyze a dynamic path converging to a 2-period equilibrium cycle. Suppose,






0; ´ < 0;
1
2M; ´ 2 [0;2M];
0; ´ > 2M:
Below, we investigate a path from the above distribution converging to a 2-period cycle. More
precisely, in this subsection and in the next, we show that the limit cycle depends on the initial
distribution; that is, if we slightly perturb the initial distribution, then the limit cycle changes
slightly.
First, we brieﬂy explain the process of obtaining the equilibrium path. As in the previous
section, we focus on the equilibria with the following policy: in each time period, there exists a
threshold ˜ ´ > 0 such that
² an agent with ´ 2 [0; ˜ ´] sells her production good, and
² an agent with ´ 2 (˜ ´;1) spends all her money.
In the ﬁrst time period, ˜ ´1 2 (0;2M) is a threshold. Note that ˜ ´1 2 (0;2M) will be shown later.





2Md´ do not have any money, and the distribution of money holdings




2M; ´ 2 [˜ p1; ˜ ´1 + ˜ p1];
0; otherwise;
where ˜ p1 is the price in the ﬁrst time period. In the second time period, we suppose that a
threshold ˜ ´2 is in [0; ˜ p1). Note that ˜ ´2 2 [0; ˜ p1) will be shown later. Thus, the money holdings





11have ˜ p2 amount of money and the other agents do not have any money, where ˜ p2 is the price
in the second time period. We will demonstrate that an equilibrium cycle starts from the third





positive amount of money, and in even periods, agents with measure h1 = 1¡h0 have a positive
amount of money.
We now obtain the equilibrium path by backward induction. As shown in the previous















where p0 and p1 are equilibrium prices in the cycle. ˜ p2 must be equal to the price in even periods
in the cycle, p0, since in the second time period and in even periods in the cycle, agents with a
positive amount of money use all of it, and the measure of the agent who sells the good is the
same. Thus, the value function in time period 2 satisﬁes













; if ´ > ˜ ´2: (10)
The value function in time period 1 is expressed as follows:
˜ V1(´) =
(
¡c + ±˜ V2(´ + ˜ p1); if ´ · ˜ ´1;
a
´
˜ p1 + ±˜ V2(0); if ´ > ˜ ´1:
The market clearing condition at time period 1 is
˜ p1 =






















Note that ˜ ´1 2 (0;2M) is automatically satisﬁed for h1 2 (0;1). Moreover, by the continuity of
˜ V1 at ´ = ˜ ´1,
¡c + ±˜ V2(˜ ´1 + ˜ p1) = a
˜ ´1
˜ p1
+ ±˜ V2(0) (13)





























¡2(1 ¡ h0)3 + h2
0(2 ¡ h0)(2 ¡ 2h0 + h2
0)± ¡ h0(1 ¡ h0)2±2 ¡ h2
0(1 ¡ h0)2(2 ¡ h0)±3
(1 ¡ ±)h0(1 ¡ h0)(2 ¡ h0)
:
Since it is veriﬁed that » is strictly increasing in h0, and
lim
h0!0
»(h0;±) = ¡1 and lim
h0!1
»(h0;±) = 1;
a unique h0 satisfying (14) exists.
Below, we check the conditions for ˜ ´2, ¯ ´0, and ¯ ´1. First, ˜ ´2 = ¯ ´0 holds, and ¯ ´0 is determined




















Similarly, ¯ ´1 is determined by (5), and thus, 0 · ¯ ´1 < p0 must be satisﬁed in equilibria. Under


















Thus, an equilibrium exists if and only if the h0, which is uniquely determined by (14), satis-
ﬁes (16) and (15). We numerically veriﬁed that a non-empty set of parameters satisfying the
conditions exists. For example, (h0;±;a;c) = (:44059;:4;10;1) satisﬁes them.
132.4 Dynamic Equilibria Leading to 3-Period Cycles
The initial distribution is the same as that in Section 2.3. We investigate dynamic equilibria
leading to a 3-period cycle. More precisely, we focus on the following policy: for some ˜ ´t > 0;t =
1;2;:::,
² an agent with ´ 2 [0; ˜ ´t] sells her production good at time period t,
² an agent with ´ 2 (˜ ´t;1) spends all her money at time period t, and
² each agent spends all her money only once in the ﬁrst three time periods, say k. Moreover,
she spends all her money at k + 3.
We suppose that the above policy is optimal. By the above, each agent’s money holding becomes
zero only once in the ﬁrst three periods, and thus, the agents are classiﬁed into three groups:
the agents whose money holdings become zero at the end of the ﬁrst, the second, and the
third periods, respectively. Let the measures of each group of agents be denoted by h1;h0, and
h2 = 1¡h0 ¡h1, respectively. We now show that the market clearing conditions for the ﬁrst six
periods determine (h1;h0) and the equilibrium prices of the ﬁrst six periods. Then, we show that
the equilibrium prices of t = 7;8;::: are determined by a diﬀerence equation, and it converges
to a limit cycle.




±t¡1(Âtaqt ¡ (1 ¡ Ât)c) + ±k+3Vk+3+1(´k+3+1)
s.t. Ât˜ ptqt + ´t+1 = ´t + (1 ¡ Ât)˜ pt; t = 1;2;:::;k + 3;
Ât˜ ptqt · ´t;´t ¸ 0; t = 1;2;:::;k + 3;
´1 ¸ 0 given;
where Vk+3+1(´k+3+1) is the value at k + 3 + 1. By the above assumption, ´k+3+1 = 0. We
suppose that the constraint ´k+3+1 ¸ 0 is binding; that is, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier
is positive. Thus, a small change of (˜ pk+3+1; ˜ pk+3+2;:::) does not aﬀect the optimal choice in
the above problem.
14For some ´a and ´b such that 0 < ´a < ´b < 2M, the threshold ˜ ´t is given by
˜ ´1 = ´b;
˜ ´2 = ´a + ˜ p1;
˜ ´t 2 (˜ pt¡1; ˜ pt¡2 + ˜ pt¡1) 8t ¸ 3:
That is, in the ﬁrst time period, agents with ´ 2 [´b;1) spend all their money, and the measure
of such agents is h1. In the second time period, agents with ´ 2 [´a + ˜ p1;1) spend all their
money, and the measure of such agents is h0. Note that by the above argument ´a and ´b do
not locally depend on (˜ p7; ˜ p8;:::) but depend only on (˜ p1; ˜ p2;:::; ˜ p6); that is, a small change in
(˜ p7; ˜ p8;:::) does not aﬀect ´a and ´b. Clearly,
´a = 2Mh2 and ´b = 2M(1 ¡ h1)
hold, where h2 = 1¡h0¡h1, and h0 and h1 only depend on (˜ p1; ˜ p2;:::; ˜ p6). Then, by the market
















(˜ pt¡2 + ˜ pt¡1) 8t = 3n + i ¸ 4:
By the above arguments, (˜ p1; ˜ p2;:::; ˜ p6) is determined by the ﬁrst 6 equations, and thus, h0 and







0 H0H1 H0(1 + H1)
0 H1H2(1 + H0) H2(H0 + H1 + H0H1)
3
5
and Hi = hi=(1 ¡ hi). Let ¸j be the eigenvalues of A and xj be the corresponding eigenvectors.
Then, we obtain











15It is veriﬁed that the characteristic equation of A is
¡t3 + (H0H1 + H1H2 + H2H0 + H0H1H2)t2 + H0H1H2t = 0:
By solving the above, we obtain
¸1 = 1; ¸2 = 0;¸3 = ¡H0H1H2 > ¡1;
x1 = [(1 + H0)H1;H0(1 + H1);1 ¡ H0H1]0; x2 = [1;0;0]0; and






(1 + H0)H1 1 1 ¡ H1H2
H0(1 + H1) 0 ¡H0(1 + H1)H2












(1 + H0)H1 1 1 ¡ H1H2
H0(1 + H1) 0 ¡H0(1 + H1)H2



























holds. Let the limit be [p1;p2;p0]0 = limn!1 Pn. Then, it is veriﬁed that (p1;p2;p0) satisﬁes the
condition that the total money holding is equal to M when the money holdings distribution is
(h0;h1;h2). In other words, the dynamic path converges to a 3-period cycle. Note that it does
not converge in ﬁnite time.
2.5 Policy on Initial Distribution
In this subsection, we investigate a permanent eﬀect of a redistribution policy. More precisely,
by slightly changing the initial money holdings distribution, the limit cycle also slightly changes;
that is, hysteresis occurs.




> > > > <
> > > > :
0; ´ · 2M²;
1
2M; ´ 2 (2M²;2M(1 ¡ ²)];
1
M; ´ 2 [2M(1 ¡ ²);2M];
0; ´ > 2M:
16Table 1: The case of ± = 0:4, a = 10, and c = 1
² 0 0.001 0.01 0.05
h0 0.55941 0.55930 0.55841 0.55514
Note that in the case of ² = 0, f1 coincides with that in Section 2.3. As in Section 2.3,








h0 is determined by (2), (3), (9), (10), (13), (17); and the market clearing condition at time















Table 1 illustrates how a change of ² induces a change of h0. In other words, the policy that
aﬀects the initial money holdings distribution has a permanent eﬀect.
2.6 Policy on Stationary Equilibrium
In this subsection, we consider an eﬀect of a tax-subsidy scheme, which is analyzed in a random
search environment in Kamiya and Shimizu [7], on the equilibrium with a cycle. More precisely,
in the model, we consider that the government levies s amount of money as a tax from g measure
of agents with money holdings more than s and gives s amount of money as a subsidy to g measure
of agents with money holdings less than s, where g is a small positive number.
We show that the size of s aﬀects the existence of the equilibria with a 2-period cycle. We
assume that (1) holds throughout this section. First, it is clear that a very small s does not
aﬀect the trading pattern. Next, we set s = M. Then, using the notations in Section 2.1, the
condition for the stationary cycle is
h1 = (1 ¡ g)f(1 ¡ g)h1 + gh0g + g f(1 ¡ g)h0 + gh1g:
Then, we obtain a unique distribution h0 = h1 = 1=2. Clearly, this is not a cycle.
17The logic is simple: If a redistribution policy is suﬃciently large, then the transition of money
holdings distributions becomes ergodic. It is well known that an ergodic stochastic process has
a unique limit distribution.
3 A General Model
In this section, we consider the logic behind the existence of a continuum of equilibrium cycles
and hysteresis in the previous section. More precisely, we show that if an equilibrium cycle exists,
then under a regularity condition, there also exists a continuum of equilibrium cycles in a rather
general framework, and that the limit cycle depends on the initial money holdings distribution.
Thus, a policy that aﬀects the initial money holdings distribution has a permanent eﬀect.
We begin with the excess demand functions. Note that the cash-in-advance constraint does
not appear explicitly, but it implicitly guarantees that money has a positive value. In other
words, in any framework in which money has a positive value, the following argument applies.
3.1 Equilibria with Cycles
There is a continuum of agents whose measure is one. The number of goods is L ¸ 1. There
exists completely divisible and durable ﬁat money of which nominal stock is M > 0.
In each time period, a Walrasian market with a cash-in-advance constraint is open for each
good. Agents have the same net demand function, denoted by z(´;p1;p2;:::) 2 RL, where ´
is the agent’s money holding at the beginning of the time period and pt 2 RL
++;t = 1;2;:::,
is a price vector in time period t. In other words, z(´;p1;p2;:::) is the ﬁrst time period net
consumption vector when the agent maximizes a utility stream under some conditions such as
budget constraints and cash-in-advance constraints. Similarly, z(´;pt;pt+1;:::) is the t-th time
period net consumption vector when the agent has ´ amount of money at the beginning of time
period t. We do not specify the domain of an inﬁnite sequence (p1;p2;:::) since we focus on the
case of cycles, and it can be considered as a ﬁnite dimensional case. We assume that for any
given (p1;p2;:::), z is a Borel measurable function of ´.
The money holding distribution at the beginning of time period 1 is a Borel probability
measure denoted by g1(¢) on R+; that is, g1(A) is the measure of agents whose money holdings
are in a Borel set A ½ R+. The transition from time period t money holding to time period t+1
18money holding is deﬁned as
Qt(´t;pt;pt+1;:::) = ´t ¡ pt ¢ z(´t;pt;pt+1;:::); t = 1;2;:::: (18)
Deﬁnition 1 For given z and g1, a pair of (p1;p2;:::) and money holdings distributions
(g2;g3;:::) is said to be an equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
² Qt(´;pt;pt+1;:::) ¸ 0 for all ´ 2 R+ and all t = 1;2;:::.
² for a Borel set A ½ R+,
gt+1(A;p) = gt(f´jQt(´;pt;pt+1;:::) 2 Ag;p); t = 1;2;:::
is satisﬁed, where g1(¢;p) = g1(¢).
² the market clearing conditions for goods and money hold: for t = 1;2;:::,
Z
z(´;pt;pt+1;:::)gt(d´;p) = 0 and
Z
´gt(d´;p) = M:







That is, each agent’s sequence of money holdings is one of the elements in the above set; for each
agent, there exists a k 2 f1;:::;Kg such that her sequence of money holdings is (´k
1;´k
2;:::). We
investigate a T-cycle equilibrium, where T ¸ 2. More precisely, T-cycle equilibria are deﬁned as
follows.





2 ;:::)g such that
² for any ´1 in the support of g1, the sequence of money holdings derived from (18), denoted
by (´1;´2;:::), is in Ω,
² ´k
t = ´k
t+T for t = 1;2;:::,
² pt = pt+T for t = 1;2;:::, and
19² K ¸ 2.





2;:::). We indicate the distribution of agents on the set of sequences of money holdings by
(h1;:::;hK), where hk is a measure of agents with (´k
1;:::;´k
T). The following conditions must
hold:





(t) = t mod T:
Then, the conditions for a T-cycle equilibrium are as follows:
´k
t ¡ ´k
(t+1) = pt ¢ z(´k








t = M; t = 1;:::;T: (21)
Note that (20) is the condition for market clearing and (21) is the condition that the total money






(t+1)) = 0; t = 1;:::;T




t ;pt;:::;p(t+T¡1)) = 0; t = 1;:::;T (22)
holds. Thus, if (19) and (21) hold, the market clearing conditions for goods 1;:::;L ¡ 1 are
suﬃcient for (20). Thus, the number of linearly independent equations in (19)–(21) is TK +
T(L¡1)+T = TL+TK. On the other hand, considering that p and ´k
t are endogenous variables,
20the system has TL+TK variables. If z is of class C1 and the Jacobian matrix of the TL+TK
equations with respect to p and ´k
t is nonsingular, then by the implicit function theorem, p
and ´k
t are locally expressed by C1 functions of (h1;:::;hK¡1). Thus, there is a continuum of
equilibrium cycles. In other words, (22) plays the role of Walras’ law in each period; that is,
there are T Walras’ laws in total. As is well known, in intertemporal models without money,
only one intertemporal Walras’ law is observed.







++ be a so-
lution to (19)–(21). Suppose the system is of class C1 and that the Jacobian matrix of the
system at the solution with respect to p and ´k
t is of rank TL + TK. Then, there is an
open set A ½ RK¡1
++ and a C1 function » : A ! RTL+TK






t )t=1;:::;T;k=1;:::;K), and (»(h1;:::;hK¡1);h1;:::;hK¡1;1 ¡
PK¡1
k=1 hk)
form a solution to the system.
Remark 3 Note that if money has a positive value, that is , p¤ 2 RTL
++, then the above theorem
holds. That is, this theorem applies to any framework, aside from economies with cash-in-advance
constraints, wherein money has a positive value.
3.2 Policy and Dynamics
In this subsection, we generalize the arguments in Subsection 2.4. More precisely, in the general
model, we show that the limit cycle varies according to the initial money holdings distribution.
Thus, a policy that aﬀects the initial money holdings distribution has a permanent eﬀect.
Below, we assume that each agent’s cash-in-advance constraint becomes binding only once
in the ﬁrst T time periods. We introduce a function fs(´;ps;ps+1;:::) 2 f0;1g such that
fs(´;ps;ps+1;:::) = 1 implies that the agents with (´;ps;ps+1;:::) spend all their money ´ in
time period s (the cash-in-advance constraint is binding), and fs(´;ps;ps+1;:::) = 0 implies
that the agents with (´;ps;ps+1;:::) do not spend all their money in time period s.
We focus on the following policy: for all t = 1;2;:::, there exists an ´t > 0 such that
² an agent with ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´t] sells her production good at time period t, and
² an agent with ´ 2 (¯ ´t;1) spends all her money at time period t.
Assumption 1 ² The above policy is optimal.
21² For a given ´1 ¸ 0, let the sequence of money holdings derived from (18) be (´1;´2;:::).
Then, for each ´1 in the support of g1, there exist only two time periods, t 2
f1;:::;Tg and t + T, in the ﬁrst 2T time periods, such that ft(´t;pt;pt+1;:::) =
ft+T(´t+T;pt+T;pt+T+1;:::) = 1.
² For all s = 1;:::;T, the measure of agents with ´ such that fs(´;ps;ps+1;:::) = 1 is
positive.
All agents whose cash-in-advance constraints become binding in time period t have the same
amount of money from t+1 onwards since such agents spend all their money at t and they take
the same consumption behavior from t + 1 onwards. Thus, in the cycle, a sequence of money




T+2;:::)g. Let the measure
of agents on the set be denoted by h = (h1;:::;hK); that is, hi is the measure of agents whose
sequence of money holdings is f(´i
T+1;´i
T+2;:::)g. By Assumption 1, K = T clearly holds.
Let p = (p1;p2;:::) be an equilibrium sequence of prices in the cycle. By Assumption 1, the










We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 Suppose in a sequence of optimal money holdings (´1;´2;:::),
fk(´k;pk;pk+1;:::) = fk+T(´k+T;pk+T;pk+T+1;:::) = 1 holds. Then, fk and fk+T do
not depend on (pk+T+1;pk+T+2;:::).
The above assumption is typically satisﬁed in cash-in-advance models. Indeed, the maximization




±t¡1(ÂtU(qt) ¡ (1 ¡ Ât)c) + ±k+TVk+T+1(´k+T+1)
s.t. Âtptqt + ´t+1 = ´t + (1 ¡ Ât)pt; t = 1;2;:::;k + T;
Âtptqt · ´t;´t ¸ 0; t = 1;2;:::;k + T;
´1 ¸ 0 given;
22where Vk+T+1(´k+T+1) is the value at k + T + 1. Suppose ´k+T+1 = 0 and that the constraint
´k+T+1 ¸ 0 is binding; that is, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier is positive. Then, a small
change of (pk+T+1;pk+T+2;:::) does not aﬀect the optimal choice in the above problem.
By Assumption 2, (h1;:::;hT) does not depend on (p2T+1;p2T+2;:::), but it depends on
the initial money holdings distribution g1. Then, from period T + 1, there exist only T-types of
money holdings: in time period t ¸ T, agents with mass hi have the same money holding for
i = 1;:::;T. Suppose the economy converges to the T-cycle. Since (h1;:::;hT) depends on g1,
temporary shocks on g1 have permanent eﬀects; that is, the model exhibits hysteresis.
4 Discussion
In the previous sections, we have demonstrated that there is a continuum of equilibrium cycles
and hysteresis occur in both speciﬁc and general models. However, the results in the general
model depend on the existence of an equilibrium cycle and the regularity conditions. One
might think that some special structures of the speciﬁc model guarantee the conditions. In this
section, we discuss the special structures in the model in Section 2 and show that our results do
not depend on such structures.
In the model, we have adopted a speciﬁc utility function and a speciﬁc production function:
the utility function is linear, and an agent can produce just one unit of good. Even if we change
these functions, the outline of the proof does not change greatly. Indeed, in Appendixes A.1 and
A.2, we demonstrate that there is a continuum of equilibrium cycles in models with a nonlinear
utility function and a convex production function.
It is well known that if the stochastic process is ergodic, then it has a unique stationary
distribution. One might think that a similar argument applies; if the economy has a small
stochastic shock, then the set of equilibrium cycles is not a continuum. In Appendix A.3, we
refute this argument; that is, even if there is a small stochastic shock in utility, a continuum of
equilibrium cycles exists.
It is possible that the participation constraint may be considered as the most restrictive
assumption in the model. Therefore, in Appendix A.4, we present a model with durable goods,
in which agents can be a seller and a buyer simultaneously, and we show that a continuum of
equilibrium cycles exists even in this case.
235 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated dynamic general equilibrium models with cash-in-advance
constraints, wherein each consumer’s money holding varies over time. We ﬁrst demonstrated
that a continuum of equilibrium cycles exists in a speciﬁc model and that the model exhibits
hysteresis; that is, the limit cycle, to which a dynamic path converges, depends on the initial
distribution of money holdings. Then, we have shown that even in a rather general framework,
the same result can be obtained; that is, if an equilibrium cycle exists, then there is a continuum
of these cycles, and the limit cycle depends on the initial distribution of money holdings.
Furthermore, we have explored the logic behind the results. The market clearing condition
for money implies Walras’ law in each period, and thus, there are T ¡ 1 degrees of freedom in
the equilibrium condition for a T-period cycle. Moreover, in the dynamic path to an equilibrium
T-cycle, there are T ¡ 1 equations that determine (h1;:::;hT¡1).
A Appendix
A.1 Nonlinear Utility Functions
In the model in Section 2, we change the utility function as follows:
U(q) =
(
aq; if q · 2
3;
2
3a; if q > 2
3:
Then, we demonstrate that a continuum of equilibria with 3-period cycles exists. We ﬁrst
construct a stationary equilibrium with 3 states and then transform it into a continuum of
equilibria with 3-period cycles.
First, we show that there exists a stationary equilibrium with the following features:
² A policy is characterized by ´ as follows:
– an agent with ´ 2 [0;´] sells her production good,





spends all her money, and






² A stationary money holdings distribution is discrete with 3 states:
– the measure of agents without money is 1=3,
24– the measure of agents with 1
3p is 1=3, and







² V is continuous.
































The latter condition is automatically satisﬁed.





¡c + ±V (´ + p); if ´ 2 [0;´];
a

















We decompose ´ ¸ 0 into an multiple of 2
3p and a residual; that is, ´ =
2np






















































; if ¶ > ´:
The continuity of V at ´ implies
´ =
p












follows from the following condition:
¡3 ¡ ± + ±2 + 3±3 + 3±4 <
3c
a
< ±(2 + ±): (25)
Note that this interval is non-empty.
The optimality condition is stated as follows:
25² V (´) ¸ 0 for any ´.
² V (´) ¸ a
p´0 + ±V (´ ¡ ´0) for any ´ 2 [0;´) and any ´0 2 [0;´].
² V (´) ¸ a
p´0 + ±V (´ ¡ ´0) for any ´0 2 [0;´).
² V (´) ¸ ¡c + ±V (´ + p) for any ´ 2 (´;1).
² V (´) ¸ a





and any ´0 2 [0;´).
² V (´) ¸ a










Under (25), it is veriﬁed that this entire condition is satisﬁed with strict inequalities. Then, we
have shown that the speciﬁed money holdings distribution and policy constitute an equilibrium
under (25).
Next, we transform the stationary equilibrium into a continuum of 3-period equilibrium
cycles. We denote the price at time period 3n + i ( i = 0;1;2) by pi. For ease of exposition,
let p3 = p0 and p4 = p1. We express the money holdings distribution by using notations hij
(i;j = 0;1;2), deﬁned as follows:
² hi0: the measure of agents with no money at time period 3n + i,
² hi1: the measure of agents with pi+1 ¡ 2
3pi+2 money at time period 3n + i, and
² hi2: the measure of agents with pi+2 money at time period 3n + i.
The condition for a stationary cycle is satisﬁed if there exists an h = (h0;h1;h2) such that
² h0 = h00 = h12 = h21,
² h1 = h01 = h10 = h22,
² h2 = h02 = h11 = h20, and
² h0 + h1 + h2 = 1.
Note that if h0 = h1 = h2 = 1=3, then they form the stationary equilibrium constructed above.

























If the condition for stationary cycle holds, this is equivalent to
p0 =












D = 27h0h1h2 + (3h0 ¡ 2h2)(3h2 ¡ 2h1)(3h1 ¡ 2h0):
D is not zero if all hij are suﬃciently close to 1=3.


























































Then, it is easily veriﬁed that the conditions for a stationary cycle and a constant stock of ﬁat
money imply the condition for market clearing; in other words, the latter is redundant.
Recall that the optimality conditions are satisﬁed with strict inequalities. Let
² h0 = 1
3 ¡ ²(1 + ²),
27² h1 = 1
3 + ², and
² h2 = 1
3 + ²2
for suﬃciently small ². Then, by redeﬁning ´ such that the value function is continuous at ´, it
is veriﬁed that (h0;h1;h2) also constitutes an equilibrium under condition (25).
A.2 Convex Cost Functions
We modify the model in Section 2 by assuming that an agent can produce any amount of her
production good with a convex cost function. Let the cost function be C(q) = bq2. We show
that there is a continuum of equilibria with a 2-period cycle even in this environment.
First, we consider the following stationary equilibrium with 2 states:
² A policy is characterized by ´ and Q(´) as follows:
– an agent with ´ 2 [0;´] sells Q(´) amount of her production good, and
– an agent with ´ 2 (´;1) spends all her money.
² The support of a stationary money holdings distribution comprises 2 states; that is,
– the measure of agents without money is 1=2, and
– the measure of agents with pQ(0) is 1=2.
² ´ + pQ(´) > ¯ ´ for any ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´].
² ´ > 0.
² V is continuous.
The value function is deﬁned as
V (´) =
(
¡b(Q(´))2 + ±V (´ + pQ(´)); if ´ 2 [0;´];
a
´
p + ±V (0); if ´ 2 (´;1):


























4b(1¡±2); if ´ 2 (´;1):





Then, the condition ´ + pQ(´) > ¯ ´ is satisﬁed for all ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´] if
2 ¡ ± ¡ 2±2 > 0: (26)
Given V as speciﬁed above, we check the optimality condition. First, we consider the condi-
tions that producing Q(´) is optimal. We denote the value of one shot deviation by choosing to
be a seller and selling q amount of goods by ˜ V (´;q); that is,
˜ V (´;q) =
(
¡bq2 + a±2q + a±2 ´
p + a2±3
4b(1¡±2); if q ·
¯ ´¡´
p ;
¡bq2 + a±q + a±
´
p + a2±4
4b(1¡±2); if q >
¯ ´¡´
p :
If q is in (
¯ ´¡´
p ;1), then ˜ V (´;q) attains the maximum value V (´) at q = a±
2b = Q(´) since
@ ˜ V
@q
= ¡2bq + a±;
and ´ + a±





˜ V (´;q) · V (´)





= ¡2bq + a±2




















hold. We can show that the above is equivalent to
1 ¡ 2±2 ¸ 0:







In addition, it is easily veriﬁed that (27) implies that there is no incentive for
² an agent with ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´] to be a buyer,
² an agent with ´ 2 (¯ ´;1) to be a seller, and
² an agent with ´ 2 (¯ ´;1) to be a buyer but not to spend all her money.


























The latter condition is automatically satisﬁed.














































This is unimodal with the peak at ² = 0. This implies that the indeterminacy is real.
A.3 Small Stochastic Shocks
Now, we introduce a preference shock into the model in Section 2; that is,
U(q) = µq;
where µ is uniformly distributed on [a ¡ Θ;a + Θ] for some Θ 2 (0;a).
We ﬁrst construct a stationary equilibrium with 2 states. The value function satisﬁes
V (´;µ) =
(
¡c + ±E˜ µV (´ + p; ˜ µ); if ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´(µ)];
µ





p ´ + a±¡c




1¡±2 ; if ´ 2 (¯ ´(µ);1):
If
Θ < a(1 ¡ ±) (28)
holds, then ¯ ´(µ) is determined as
¯ ´(µ) =
a± ¡ c
(1 + ±)(µ ¡ a±)
p:
The condition 8µ, ¯ ´(µ) 2 (0;p) is equivalent to
c
a
< ± and (29)
Θ <
a(1 ¡ ± ¡ ±2) + c
1 + ±
: (30)
31By (28)–(30), the equilibrium condition can be expressed by (30) and




In other words, if the size of the noise is suﬃciently small, there exists a stationary equilibrium
with 2 states. Thus, it can be transformed into a continuum of 2-period equilibrium cycles, as
in the previous sections.
Remark 4 It is worthwhile to compare the above result with that of Lucas [10], who shows that
a stochastic version of a cash-in-advance model has a unique limit distribution. This result is







where U is the instantaneous utility and ¯ µ is the upper bound of realization of a stochastic element
µ. It implies that, for any agent, there always exists a small probability that she consumes some
amount of goods irrespective of the amount of ﬁat money she has. This renders an economy-wide
money holdings transition ergodic.
A.4 Durable Goods
There exist a perishable good x and a durable good y; we assume that both goods are divisible.
The durable good can be consumed for two time periods; that is, the depreciation rates in the
second and third time periods are zero and one respectively. We assume that if an agent has
a positive amount of the durable good, she cannot buy the good.6 An agent obtains utility ay
when she consumes y amount of the durable good, where a > 0. Each agent is endowed with one
unit of the perishable good, and the durable good is produced by production function y = ®x,
where ® > 0. Moreover, we do not impose the participation constraint; an agent can buy and
sell simultaneously.
We show that a continuum of equilibria with 2-period cycles exists. We ﬁrst construct a
stationary equilibrium and then transform it into a continuum of equilibria with 2-period cycles.
First, we consider the following candidate for stationary equilibrium. Let the prices of x and
y be p and q respectively. Then, by the zero proﬁt condition, q =
p
®.
6Even if we assume that she can buy the durable good, we obtain similar results.
32² The policy is characterized by ´ as follows:
– an agent with ´ 2 [0;´] only sells one unit of x and does not buy y;
– an agent with ´ 2 (´;1) and without durable good sells one unit of x and spends all
her money for y good; and
– an agent with positive y only sells one unit of x.
² A stationary money holdings distribution is discrete with 2 states:
– the measure of agents with p money and with 2® amount of the durable good is 1=2,
and
– the measure of agents with 2p money and without durable good is 1=2.
² ´ is in ´ 2 (0;p).
² V is continuous.

















The latter condition is automatically satisﬁed.
The value function satisﬁes
V (p;2®) = 2a® + ±V (2p;0) and
V (2p;0) = 2a® + ±V (p;2®):
Then, we obtain











+ ±2V (2p;0) = a±
¯ ´ + p
q








Then, ¯ ´ < p is automatically satisﬁed.


















Thus, for ´ 2 [0; ¯ ´],









Similarly, for y > 0,











Next, we transform the stationary equilibrium with 2 states into a continuum of equilibria
with 2-period cycles by perturbing the money holdings distribution. Let the prices at time 2n
and 2n + 1 be p0 and p1 respectively. Let h0 be the measure of agents with p1 in even periods
and p0 + p1 in odd periods, and let h1 be the measure of agents with p0 in odd periods and
p0 + p1 in even periods. Obviously, h0 + h1 = 1 holds.
The condition that the total money holding is equal to M is
M = p1h0 + (p0 + p1)h1; (32)
M = p0h1 + (p0 + p1)h0: (33)
Subtracting (33) from (32), we obtain
p0h0 = p1h1: (34)
34The conditions for market clearing are
p0 = (p0 + p1)h1 and
p1 = (p0 + p1)h0:
The above conditions are clearly obtained from (34). Thus, the conditions for a stationary cycle











for suﬃciently small ². Then, by redeﬁning ´ such that the value function is continuous at ´, it
is veriﬁed that they also constitute an equilibrium.
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